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_________________________________________________ 
This paper focuses on why shared sovereignty in general has been problematic and 
why the political economy of liberal peace has had limited impacts on poverty and the 
role of crime in Southeast Europe. The analysis begins with shared sovereignty and its 
relevance to economic development. The paper then outlines the discouraging 
economic situation evidenced by documentation and fieldwork. I then ask the 
question ‘how do people cope?’, and try to answer this with reference to the labour 
market and the non-observable economy. The argument is that economy of survival 
has been both a negotiation with, and resistance to, economic policies introduced from 
outside. Finally, the paper contemplates political economy approaches that emphasise 
production and employment creation. 
________________________________________________ 
 
 
1. Shared Sovereignty for a Liberal Peace 
 
Quite apart from the alleged hollowing out of states by economic processes of 
globalisation, state sovereignty is a highly flexible concept, constructed to provide 
various meanings in different historical contexts.1 It is often merged, and confused, 
with a capacity to govern. Indeed recent articulations suggest that incapacity is an 
obstacle to sovereignty. States deemed to be weak, collapsing, ‘failed’ or war-torn are 
considered to lack the necessary mechanisms of sovereignty2 – like trusteeship 
territories after the First World War that required nursing into sovereign statehood. 
Prolonged effort by trustee powers, colonial protectorates or international 
administrations are therefore regarded as essential to build up state sovereignty. 
However, the capacity criterion is also highly contingent and normative, for there is 
another kind of contention based on a concept of right. Some states are said to 
invalidate their sovereignty through failure to abide by rules of international 
behavior.3 In this case, they have too much capacity, have to be weakened, even 
invaded and converted into war-torn societies. In both cases, sovereignty is negotiated 
with the external world and mediated by the most powerful members of the 
international system who decide upon issues of failed capacity and failed validity.  
 
The contingent and normative nature of sovereignty also raises the question of 
whether states should be reconstructed at all, and whether the problem lies in an 
idealised vision of statism and the dominant narrative framework of the 
developmentalist state.  Normal is defined as integrated, and the primary role of the 
state ‘is increasingly geared far more towards the reproduction of the private national 
economy against normative standards set by an ideal-typical economic ‘globality’.4  
                                                 
1 For the normative conceptualisation of sovereignty, see Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, 
State Sovereignty as a Social Construct, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
2 William Zartman (ed.) Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995.  
3 See, Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, Oxford: OUP, 1990, p.8. 
4 Angus Cameron and Ronen Palan, The Imagined Economies of Globalization, London: Sage, 2004, 
p.19. The poor are no longer part of society but efforts to ‘include’ mean that that they are treated as 
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Territories in South-east Europe illustrate several of these issues. The perceived 
illegitimacy of Serbia’s sovereignty in Kosovo, the imagined future of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH) as a unitary state, the protectorate administrations in Kosovo and 
BiH, and quests to submerse South-east European sovereignties into an EU supra-
sovereignty may seem to indicate the absence of a single, guiding paradigm. But this 
is to ignore the liberal peace, a framework of governance introduced by external 
actors to war-torn societies and states in so-called ‘transition’.5  
  
In many contexts, from Timor-Leste to Iraq, it has been argued that 
peacebuilding and state-building has not worked particularly well. In some cases, 
peace itself remains disputed; in others, constitutions arising from peace generate 
discontent; and in others, reforms stall. One interpretation is that the liberal peace 
assumptions are fine but the implementation is flawed. Coordination among 
peacebuilding agencies would provide an answer, for example. But mostly the 
problems lie with the ‘hosts’ who are characterised as corrupt, incompetent or 
underdeveloped. Another interpretation is that state building projects have met 
resistance or lacked sustainability not merely on account of maverick spoilers or 
paucity of administrative skills. The assumptions in the liberal peace project are 
flawed and have weak foundations in political sovereignty. 
 
David Chandler notes the important shift written into the report of the 
Independent Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.6 The Commission 
stressed that the rights of sovereignty could coexist with an international right to 
protect because sovereignty now meant a state’s accountability to the ‘community of 
responsible states’ as well as to its own population. The new concept was 
‘partnership’, which in practice signified that the accountability of local partners to 
external agencies rather than to their own people. Sovereignty is thus normalised by 
adherence to certain forms of behavior (strict budgets, human rights observance, 
‘good governance’). Weak and failed states, or strong states made weak by regime 
change, are to be relieved of sovereignty and accorded – in Stephen Krasner’s 
phraseology – ‘shared sovereignty’.7 This is not only a moral commitment to protect 
victims but a new right: the right of the interveners to determine what happens next. 
For economist Paul Collier this is imperative because conflict risks are asymmetrical: 
‘Most of the costs of conflict are for neighbours and the wider community. And so we 
can’t allow sovereignty. We have rights.’8
                                                                                                                                            
‘flawed consumers’ where rules of globalisation do not apply (p.20). See also, Lionel Cliffe and Robin 
Luckham, 'Complex Political Emergencies and the State: Failure and the Fate of the State,' Third World 
Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 1, 1999, pp.27–50.  
5 See, Mark Duffield, Global Governance and  the New Wars, London: Zed, 2001; David Chandler, 
‘Imposing the Liberal Peace’, in Alex J. Bellamy and Paul Williams (eds), Peace Operations and 
Global Order, London: Routledge, pp.64–66. 
6 See the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to 
Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background, Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 
2001, p.11. 
7 Stephen D. Krasner, ‘The Case for Shared Sovereignty’, Journal of Democracy, Vol.16, No. 1, 2005, 
pp. 69-83. 
8 Paul Collier, ‘Private Sector Development and Peacebuilding’, conference organised by GTZ, DFID 
and International Alert, Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berlin, 14–15 September 2006 (text 
transcribed from a keynote address recording at 
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From a critical perspective this capacity building is highly ambiguous because 
the construction of international administrative power is privileged over domestic 
political processes. Moreover, in Chandler’s view, the underlying goal of the external 
partners is ‘not to create independent, autonomous, self-governing entities’ and 
restore a Westphalian sovereignty, but to avoid responsibility for the exercise of 
power – a denial of empire.9 Shared governance in post-bellum conditions thus 
disguises a dual impact on sovereignty: the evasion of responsibility for power and 
attenuation of the ability of communities to govern themselves.10 The notion that life 
can be reorganised administratively and is beyond politics seems to be particularly 
relevant in the sphere of economic development, perhaps because it requires 
deference to the necromancy of econometrics that ordinary mortals cannot aspire to 
understand.11 At any rate the internationals have had extraordinary powers of 
direction over economic agendas. This is not to deny the coincidences of interest 
among local elites and international planners. Indeed economic reform creates new 
opportunity structures that often benefit war entrepreneurs. But economic conversion 
has long been a touchstone of liberal peacebuilding, and it would be surprising if 
locals elites did not resist it initially. 
  
 
2. Economic Transition  
 
Indeed, it is reasonable to argue that in the economic field, not even shared 
sovereignty has been part of the deal. At both Dayton and Rambouillet economic 
transition was nailed firmly to mast of intervention, and was embedded in the 
constitutional arrangements for both BiH and Kosovo.12 In effect the economic future 
                                                                                                                                            
www.businessenvironment.org/dyn/be/besearch.details?p_phase_id=108&p_lang=en&p_phase_type_i
d=6).  
9 David Chandler, Empire in Denial: the politics of state-building, London: Pluto, 2006, ch.2. 
10 The administrative denial of power, in Chandler’s terms, is: ‘dishonest, reactionary and elitist’, for it 
insinuates that power can do little to produce change, even leading to a rejection of its capacity for 
social progress entirely. Ibid., pp.193–4. 
11 However, there is a growing political economy literature for BiH and a South East European Journal 
of Economics and Business began publishing in Sarajevo in 2006. See: Vesna Bojicić-Dželilović, 
Fikret Caušević and Rajko Tomaš, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina – Understanding Reform’, Global 
Development Network Southeast Europe, June 2004; Susan L. Woodward, ‘Economic Priorities for 
Successful Peace Implementation’, in Stephen Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth Cousens 
(eds), Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 
2002, pp. 183-214; Raiko Tomaš, ‘Efficiency Constraints on the Economy of  Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’, in Christopher Solioz and T.K. Vogler (eds), Dayton and Beyond: Perspectives on the 
future of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2004, pp.99-119; Peter Andreas (ed.), 
Problems of Post-Communism, Vol.51, No.3, May/June 2004; Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper with 
Jonathan Goodhand, War Economies in a Regional Context: Challenges of Transformation, Boulder 
CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004; Nikolaos Tzifakis and Charalambos Tsardanidis, ‘Economic reconstruction 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina: The lost decade’, Ethnopolitics, Vol.5, No.1, March, 2006, pp.67–84; Neil 
Cooper and Michael Pugh (eds), ‘War Economies, Peace and Globalisation’, Conflict, Security and 
Development, Vol.6, no.3, special issue, October 2006; Fikret Caušević, Foreign trade policy and trade 
balance of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo: Economic Institute, 2006; Berit Bliesemann de Guevara, 
‘Bosnia’s Political Economy’, in Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper (eds), Critical Perspectives on War 
Economies (forthcoming 2007).  
12 In Annex 4 of the Dayton accords, the BiH Constitution seeks ‘general welfare and economic growth 
through the protection of private property and the promotion of a market economy’. In the Rambouillet 
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was mapped out under the control of the peacemaking powers. It was also 
implemented by them. UNMIK exercised almost exclusive authority for the economy 
in Kosovo, acting through the EU’s responsibility for economic reconstruction 
(‘almost’ because USAID commanded a regulatory framework for the financial sector 
outside UNMIK). This external control extended to the privatisation process once the 
Kosovo Trust Agency became the exclusive landlord of social and public property. In 
BiH the economy was also in ‘protectorate’ hands, mainly the World Bank, IMF and 
EBRD. The IMF controlled the budget until 2005, and the Central Bank/Currency 
Board was under the direction of an international figure. The whole purpose was not 
classical development, but to build capacity, harmonise and to jump start BiH into the 
post-industrial EU environment. 
 
As elsewhere in the region, the IFIs and international agencies have been 
instrumental in introducing policies in BiH to support low inflation, budget balancing, 
a stable currency and enhanced tax revenue. The IMF insists on VAT revenue being 
used to balance the budget rather than for investment, and has also tried to cut 
maternity leave rights and agricultural subsidies. Strategic thinking by domestic 
political elites and experts was also reflected in the country’s Medium-term 
Development Strategy.13 Economic growth has been largely dependent on 
dismantling the state-led economic system and creating an environment favourable to 
business and FDI.  
 
At the same time that macroeconomic austerity was introduced in BiH, localised 
construction booms and buoyant growth rates occurred from infusions of aid, thereby 
ensuring a degree of recovery. In terms of commercial law, property rights, 
macroeconomic policies, budgets, taxation and trade, the OHR and the IFIs 
introduced significant reforms, including abolition of the old payments bureaux and 
sales tax. But in 2000 BiH was still operating at 48% of pre-war gdp per head and 
reform implementation has been stumbling at best. After a 10-year presence the 
internationals had made an impact, but an Independent Commission on the Balkans 
noted alarming levels of public distrust in politics and the economic future, and 
described the whole region as becoming a marginalised ghetto.14 By most accounts 
the economy of BiH has not moved as fast or as far forward as anticipated. In broad 
terms, growth in production is weak, FDI slow, unemployment high; and there is a 
large foreign trade imbalance.  
 
Official statistics and basic indicators (see appendix) give only a partial picture 
of experience and do not explain how ordinary people have coped. Statistics gathering 
and analysis in BiH has certainly improved since 1995 and there are now regular 
surveys. But basic indicators should be treated with caution for the following reasons:  
                                                                                                                                            
document, Chapter 4, Economic Issues, article 1(1) stated that ‘the economy of Kosovo shall function 
in accordance with free-market principles’. The ideology was subsequently included in the 
constitutional framework.  
13 (EPPU, 2006). 
14 Especially in Bosnia where over 70% of respondents rated both the situation and the government as 
‘bad’. The Commission was chaired by former Italian Prime Minister, Giuliano Amato, and comprised 
almost entirely of serving and former regional (male) politicians of impeccably conservative 
credentials. International Commission on the Balkans, The Balkans in Europe’s Future, April 2005 
(available at: www.balkan-commission.org/activities/Report.pdf), pp.10–11, 40 
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● There is no accurate statistic for the size of population (estimated at 3.85m in 2005). 
The most recent census was in 1991, and although the war exiles and returnees have 
been measured, there has been no record of outward migration since the end of the 
war. This is believed to be significant, particularly among dual passport-holding 
Croats. Emigration is also assumed to be illicit in part. 
● There is no accurate series for gdp, let alone gdp per capita. Until 2004 gdp 
excluded rents, and in 2006 still excluded cooperative farm production. The gdp 
figures are frequently refined. 
● By definition there is no accurate figure for the non-observable economy (NOE), 
and the possibility of flawed or fraudulent information offered to auditing authorities, 
such as the Central Bank. For example, anecdotal evidence suggests that international 
agencies have been known to overstate salaries they actually pay.15
● There are no reliable indicators for FDI outflows. 
● Finally, unemployment is variously defined and rates need careful interpretation.  
 
In addition to economic data, BiH is regularly surveyed for perceptions. The 
difficulties of evaluating perceptions are well-known. In a small survey I conducted of 
almost a hundred people throughout the country 24% agreed with the statement that 
the economic situation was improving (no-one ‘agreed strongly’). On the other hand, 
51% disagreed or disagreed strongly. Had I asked the question: ‘do you think the 
situation is better or worse than in 1991, or in 1995?’ the answers would perhaps have 
been different. Nevertheless, there is a degree of consistency about the response to 
UNDP early warning surveys over time on one question in particular: ‘would you 
leave BiH if given a chance?’ In the first quarter of 2006, 71% of 18–35 year olds said 
‘yes’.16 Overall, in the first quarter of 2006, 70.6% described the economic situation 
as generally or very bad.17 Perhaps because of an earlier time-lag in reconstruction in 
RS, general expectations for all ages were improving in Serb majority areas in the 
first quarter of 2006, whereas anticipation of economic deterioration was higher in 
Bosniak and Croat dominated areas. In Bosniak areas 20% expected to lose their 
within 3 months.18 Confidence in politics, institutions and administration remained 
very low, and in a three-quarter year period to March 2006, 50–60% of respondents 
had negative views of a range of measures taken by the OHR: around 30% having 
positive views.19  
 
It is important to remember, however, that location is as significant as the 
overall picture presented by national data.  
 
 
3. Borderlands and Spatial Divergences 
 
In any discussion of economic transition it is vital to remember that spatial 
divergences are manifested in various ways – in spite of the sustained effort by 
Bosniaks and international agencies to recentralise the state. 
                                                 
15 Interview with local manager of EU training projects, Sarajevo, 4 Sept. 2006. 
16 UNDP, Early Warning System Quarterly Report, January-March 2006, annex table V, p.56. 
17 Ibid., annex table III, p.55. 
18 Ibid., table V1,  p.31.  
19 Ibid., annex table V, pp.72–73. 
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● First, there are continuities in the varied levels of geographical distribution of 
wealth and growth. Some of the poorest areas in former Yugoslavia continue to be 
very poor and rely heavily on remittances. Sarajevo and Banja Luka continue to 
attract resources and generate employment.  
 
● Second, the war and geostrategic situation after Dayton, left some areas without 
infrastructure and officially-regulated trading and consumer hinterlands. Eastern and 
south-eastern parts of RS have experienced economic collapse as a consequence. In 
the north, Tuzla’s connections with towns in RS were attenuated.  
 
● Third, areas dependent on specific productive capacities have declined dramatically. 
The cities of Zenica and Tuzla have declined through failure to generate industrial 
production. Areas heavily dependent on agriculture throughout BiH have been 
disadvantaged by policy neglect (see below). 
 
● Fourth, borderlands are difficult to categorise since they have both internal and 
classic characteristics. Some became inter-state borderlands after being internal, such 
as Livanjsko Polje on the Croatian border. Others, around Doboj for example, were 
scenes of bitter fighting in the war and are inter-entity borderlands internal to the 
state. Both types have been important sites of smuggling and other illegal activities. 
But they have also seen a revival in co-operative supplies for food processing that link 
poor to wealthier areas. Doboj is a base for the Vegafruit Company with 5,000 co-
operatives (2,000 of which are in the poorer eastern part of the RS). This, and another 
company Meggle Bihać, also supplied by co-operatives, bring deprived and richer 
areas together.  
 
Taking the unreliability of statistics and these uneven spatial transitions into 
account, how is the general picture to be explained? 
 
4. Explanations 
 
Of course persistent structural problems from the Yugoslav period were not easily 
dismantled. For example, the lack of FDI in greenfield sites is probably due to 
perceived instability and excessive red tape and charges/bribes, especially in securing 
construction permits. In BiH the most frequently-observed factors are: the levels of 
administration created by Dayton; the institutional/capacity deficit; political and 
ethnic obstacles; dependency on aid; tax evasion; corrupt elites and enriched war 
entrepreneurs who protect their criminal activities.20  
 
These explanations tend to assume a clash between a neoliberal modernity and 
a pre-modern ‘Balkan way’. But this underestimates linkages between the reformist 
impulse and nationalist–mafia–clientalist elites, many of them enriched by primitive 
accumulation during the wars. The international presence and reform policies have 
                                                 
20 See, e.g., Nikolaos Tzifakis and Charalambos Tsardanidis, ‘Economic reconstruction of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: The lost decade’, Ethnopolitics, Vol.5, No.1, March, 2006, pp.67–84; Raiko Tomaš, 
‘Efficiency Constraints on the Economy of  Bosnia and Herzegovina’, in Christopher Solioz and T.K. 
Vogler (eds), Dayton and Beyond: Perspectives on the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 2004, pp.99-119. 
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created opportunity structures for local elites. To take one example, it is apparent that 
in both BiH and Kosovo nationalist war entrepreneurs were in the best position to 
‘capture’ state assets and to exploit the privatisation processes.21 International 
administrators/advisers and locals are also bound together by a reciprocal evasion of 
responsibility, blaming each other for lack of progress. Both externals and war 
entrepreneurs had a pliant, impoverished population in the economic sphere that could 
be exploited for loyalty (by the war entrepreneurs) and moulded for modernization 
(by the externals). Above all, the external administrators and local elites are inclined 
to privilege business and private wealth (whether through FDI or support to SMEs) as 
the motor for economic change. A third of EU pre-accession agreement funds go to 
support SMEs, though this is a relatively costly model for BiH, compared to 
development programs in Africa, for example.  
 
I have written elsewhere about the beliefs and practices in the political 
economy of peacebuilding.22 The values vary from agency to agency but have a 
common basis in development theories, and were taken to an extreme perhaps under 
Paul Bremer in Iraq. The protectors introduce a model of economic transition, which 
ultimately derives from an imagined or idealised view of a free-market economy. By 
‘imagined’, I do not mean that capitalism and its advantages do not exist in practice. I 
mean that the ideal is conflated with the real by ignoring inconsistencies and discords. 
To take an example pertinent for Southeast Europe, agricultural protection is accepted 
in advanced economies but regarded by external agencies as an obstacle to 
transformation elsewhere.  
 
In this respect it is essential to disaggregate the capital sector. Briefly, the 
banking, trade and service sectors exhibit social networks that have the greatest 
interest in maintaining poor regulation and stifling agricultural and industrial 
production. Industrial production is less vulnerable to corruption, has employment 
potential and could be galvanised by investment, flexible employment practices, 
import substitution and temporary protection. It has been largely unsupported and its 
infrastructure neglected, and only two people in ministerial offices in Sarajevo have 
responsibility for industrial growth.23 Agriculture has been even more neglected by 
policy elites, and in 1995–2000 accounted for only 3.82% of reconstruction value, 
compared to 8.20% in credit lines for the business sector.24 Politicians resisted the 
establishment of a Ministry of Agriculture (in spite of EU pressure). When, 
eventually, Adnan Terzić as chair of the Council of Ministers agreed to the idea this 
was regarded by some in the RS as further evidence of over-centralisation in 
                                                 
21 Michael Pugh, ‘Postwar Political Economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: the Spoils of Peace’, Global 
Governance, vol.6, no.4, 2002, pp.467–82. In Kosovo, for example, UNMIK supported $1bn of sales 
to local entrepreneurs, with 80% of the proceeds placed in a ‘legacy fund’ for other claimants. But the 
assets were sold to government cronies at knock down prices – so that the 80% represented very little 
in absolute terms. 
22 E.g., ‘The Political Economy of Peacebuilding: A Critical Perspective’, International Journal of 
Peace Studies, Vol.10, No.2, autumn/winter, 2005, pp.23–42; ‘Post-war Economies and the New York 
Dissensus’, Conflict, Security and Development, Vol.6, no.3, special issue, October 2006, pp.269–89.  
23 Interview with Fikret Caušević, Director, Economic Institute, Sarajevo, 5 Sept. 2006.   
24 International Management Group Databases, Summary Report: Donor Aid to BiH: Economic Task 
Force Secretariat, Vol. 3, Issue 5. 
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Sarajevo.25 Nevertheless, food imports and lack of investment have hit many areas 
particularly hard, and led to protests, including a long-running ‘camp-out’ near the 
twin towers in Sarajevo (illustrated).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By contrast, creating a business environment has been a very high priority and 
this is particularly evident in the approach to growth and employment, which is an 
issue of contention.  
 
 
5. The Labor Market and Abuse 
 
The official data for unemployment based on registration is extraordinarily high: a 
rate above 45% in 2006. A more restrictive definition, based on people actively 
seeking work, as used by the International Labor Office (ILO), puts the figure closer 
to 30%. Most observers agree, however, that both of these measures inflate 
unemployment because they exclude people who are working in the grey economy. 
Data for 2001 indicate that 362,000 were working unofficially throughout BiH, which 
makes the true rate for unemployment about 20%.26 On the other hand, countervailing 
variables also come into play: the high rate of unemployment discourages people from 
seeking jobs at all, and some people get struck off the registers for failing to turn up to 
the Employment Service for whatever reason. There are three further points to make. 
First, even an average rate of 20% is well above the west European average, and has 
been increasing steadily since 1998. Second, there are pockets where the rate is much 
higher, for example, in Brcko District and Zenica. Third, in order to register as 
                                                 
25 Interview with Želko Kabanja, proprietor Nezavisne Novine, Banja Luka, 7 Sept. 2006. 
26 A World Bank calculation for 2001 claimed that about 36% of the employed was working 
informally. ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina, Labor Market in Postwar Bosnia and Herzegovina: How to 
Encourage Businesses to Create Jobs and Increase Worker Mobility’, Human Development Unit, 
South-East Europe Country Unit, Europe and Central Asia region, World Bank Report no. 24889-BIH, 
4 November 2002. By contrast, Rajko Tomaš used labour inspection reports of municipalities in RS in 
2006 to calculate that about 240,000 workers are in regular jobs; 140–150,000 are ‘unemployed’, of 
whom about 40,000 are working on the black market (about 20% of workers). This provides a rate of 
18–20% for the RS. Rajko Tomaš, Živka Pržulj and Ivan Šijaković, Nezaposleni: recurs ili socijalni 
problem? Banja Luka: Gradfid, 2004. Interviews with Professor Rajko Tomaš, Banja Luka, 8 
September 2006; Zlatko Hurtić (Economic Adviser, BiH Prime Minister), Sarajevo, 4 June 2006. 
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unemployed, workers have to be employed for a month. To do this they often pay 
employers to work.  
 
In both the registered and unregistered markets, abuse of labour rights is quite 
usual. The survey I conducted in June–September 2006, the first of its kind, revealed 
that 14.1% of respondents had experience of failure by employers to pay at all; 57.6% 
had experienced failure by employers to pay on time; 26.1% had experience of only 
being paid part of their money; 72.8% had been required to work longer hours than 
contracted; 23.9% had been dismissed without notice or good reason; 21.7% had been 
harassed or asked to do something illegal. It made little difference whether the 
employer was in the formal or informal sector. Of the respondents, 35.9% had 
experienced rights denial in a public company, 56.5% in a private company, 5.4% 
from an individual and 1.1% from an international organisation or NGO. Over a third 
who had experienced denial of labour rights thought that an international agency had 
provided assistance to an employer who had engaged in this kind of abuse. 
 
Clearly, the labor market needs to be more dynamic. Worker mobility has been 
modest, reflecting a skills gap. The workforce is ageing as established workers hold 
on to their privileges. Labor force participation is low, especially among women (only 
28%, c.f. men at 62%). Deregulation of employment protection in 2000 has made it 
easier to fire people, but the World Bank and other institutions still cavil about highly 
structured and formalised wage bargaining that add to production costs.27 Above all, 
job creation is low. SMEs may be the main source of new jobs, for that is where 
international assistance has gone, but job losses outweigh gains in that sector. 
Incentives to seek work depend heavily on work being available.  
 
Yet the mission statement of the Economic Transition Unit (ETU) makes no mention 
at all of jobs, unemployment or poverty. It stresses activities have a bearing on improving 
BiH’s fiscal architecture and making its business environment more attractive to 
international and domestic investors.28 The Jobs and Justice program introduced in 2002 
was similarly indicative of the priorities of the OHR and other agencies, relying heavily on 
the indirect effects in the operation of market forces, rather than direct invention of an 
employment policy.29 The program’s authors even denied that the state could create jobs, 
conveniently forgetting that their own salaries were paid by states or intergovernmental 
institutions.  
 
 
6. How do People Cope? 
 
                                                 
27 Bosnia and Herzegovina. Labor Market in Postwar Bosnia and Herzegovina: How to Encourage 
Businesses to Create Jobs and Increase Worker Mobility, Human Development Unit, South-East 
Europe Country Unit, Europe and Central Asia region, World Bank Report no. 24889-BIH, 4 
November 2002. 
28 The ETU website is at www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/econ (accessed 20 March 2006). 
29 @Jobs and Justice’ was to serve a political as well as economic purpose. Politically, it was to assist 
the cross-ethnic Social Democratic Party (SDP), keystone of the Alliance for Change Government, to 
get re-elected. In this it failed miserably as the electors turned back to nationalist politics. The reasons 
had less to do with the Jobs and Justice manifesto than with the fractures in the Alliance in the context 
of a very narrow majority in parliament.  
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Poverty indicators for BiH have been tracked by the World Bank, a Living Standards 
Measurement Survey, and the Economic Policy and Planning Unit for the Council of 
Ministers. Analysis in May 2005 indicates that poverty in 2001–2004 remains at 
about 18%. Given, also, that 5.7% of respondents to a UNDP survey in the first 
quarter of 2006 claimed that they had no form of cash income, and a further 45.5% 
claimed they received less than 400KM a month,30 the question obviously arises: how 
do people cope and survive? There are several reasons that have very little to do with 
the macroeconomic policies for transition introduced from outside. Indeed, some of 
the factors discussed below, such as the size of the informal economy, are antithetical 
to reform. 
 
First, BiH benefited from international aid and transfers. Whereas aid still 
represented about 3% of gdp in 2006, transfers in the form of spending by externals, 
was about 9% of gdp. This may have generated a dependency culture but transfers 
and employment with international agencies enabled many people to get by. 
 
Second, entitlements (veterans benefits, pensions and welfare for victims of war) 
have been ‘life-savers’. Research on poverty indicates that entitlements are 
particularly important in female-headed households in the form of widows’ benefits, 
for example.31 It is easy to criticise these for being a drain on the budget but the 
largesse is not all it seems. Entitlements are not always paid, have to be fought for, 
and provide a meagre source of income. 32 Child benefits have already ended in most 
Federation cantons, even though the number of children in a household is a key factor 
in poverty. Health provisions are basic and often need supplementing with a bribe to 
get reasonable service (the bribe for an appendix operation in a Central Bosnian city is 
250KM).33   
 
Third, the non-observable economy (NOE) is a source of income. This takes many 
forms and needs to be disaggregated.  
 
● Black economies. Corruption and fraud have been particular features of the BiH 
transition, and is in part a legacy of the pre-war as well as wartime periods. This is 
entirely consistent with the underground economies of the second world war (when a 
                                                 
30 UNDP, Early Warning System Quarterly Report, January-March 2006, p.77. Household status 
perceptions indicate that about 20% (67.7% in Brcko) claim to be barely susbsisting, ibid., p.86. 
31 Female headed households have higher consumption than male-headed: Luigi Cuna, ‘Assessing 
Household Vulnerability to Employment Shocks: A Simulation Methodology Applied to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’, unpublished paper, University of Bologna, 2004. 
32 After a long campaign by women victims of the war, the Amended Law on Social Benefits created a 
special category for women civil war victims, i.e. those who were raped and sexually abused. They 
qualify by proving a 60–70% disability. In theory they are then entitled to financial benefits, priority 
employment, priority housing, vocational training, psychological and legal assistance. Since the law 
was implemented 1 September 2006, women who had qualified for this status were supposed to start 
receiving 350KM a month on 1 October. This did not happen, and the women were told that payments 
would commence at 514KM, with the probability of a 4% decrease subsequently. As of mid-February 
2007 this had not been paid and women had usually not received any of the other entitlements. 
Information from Michaelina Jakala, Grbavica, 18 February 2007. 
33 Based on interviews in Zenica in June and September 2006. 
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host of new crimes were also created by legislation).34 Lack of regulation and the 
legitimation of war elites have also played a role in the activities that deprive the 
government of revenue. Organised crime has been significant in sustaining the 
activities of war criminals, and is manifested in the plethora of petrol stations used for 
money-laundering. However, the BiH criminal networks, while dangerous, are not big 
players by regional standards and have not been targeted by external networks. 
However, it also has to be recognised that criminal activity provides employment and 
a cushion against poverty for some people at street level. If it is the case that 50% of 
Montenegrin gdp is based on cigarette smuggling, then such criminality clearly 
involves a large number of people.35   
 
● Coping economies 
 
– Shadow employment. As indicated above, informal employment is such a significant 
aspect of the labor market that it is clearly an essential element in household 
consumption. It almost certainly keeps people above the poverty line, particularly in 
rural areas (agriculture being the biggest informal employer) and among households 
headed by women who are more likely to take part-time, temporary and low-income 
jobs.36  
 
– Illegal trading. In contrast to Afghanistan and Iraq there is no obvious source of 
widespread illegal production in Southeast Europe, such as poppy or oil. Rather, the 
illegal survival and coping economies depend largely on petty trading, smuggling, 
bribery and tax evasion. Interviews suggest that this is particularly widespread and, of 
course, based on cash. 
 
– Legal remittances and transfers. One of the most significant, non-observable coping 
mechanism in BiH, Kosovo and Macedonia is the availability of diaspora remittances 
and transfers, continuing a pre-war tradition. These are cited variously as accounting 
for anything between 11% and 30% of the BiH gdp and are significant in servicing 
the current account deficit.37 Nationally, the average amount remitted by diaspora 
individuals was perceived by my respondents to be worth about 200–250 KM per 
month. In poor, rural Herzegovinan cantons they represent a disproportionate source 
of income. This sector can be further disaggregated into:  
observable electronic transfers, accounting for about 53% of remittances;  
                                                 
34 In the UK, organised gangs conducted armed robberies with limited risk during the blitz. Prostitution 
and other rackets flourished. Administrators in government service stole from stores, especially petrol. 
Some 200,000 military deserters created new identities, laundered money at race tracks, traded black 
market goods and forged ration books. Thefts from the army were enormous. This was not merely a 
reflection of hostility to the command economy (shopkeepers simply could not survive on selling 
rationed goods). For the most part rationing was considered fair. The ‘crime’ was partly a response to 
new opportunity structures, the great uncertainty of life and was a way of ‘doing good turns’ to people 
who you might never see again. Donald Thomas, An Underworld at War: Spivs, Deserters, Racketeers 
and Civilians in the Second World War, London: John Murray, 2004. 
35 Peter Andreas ‘Criminalizing Consequences of Sanctions: Embargo Busting and Its Legacy’, 
International Studies Quarterly, vol.49, p.349. 
36 Fikret Caušević, Foreign trade policy and trade balance of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo: 
Economic Institute, 2006. 
37 Interviews with Zlatko Hurtić (see above); Amir Hadziomeragić, Head of Economic Research and 
Statistics Unit, BiH Central Bank, Sarajevo, 5 September 2006. 
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non-observable cash remittances brought by couriers;  
seasonal labour abroad;  
in-kind transfers and diaspora expenditures (e.g. on car repairs and 
dentistry).  
 
For households, diaspora assistance is essential for daily living expenses, special 
needs (such as medical treatment), housing, consumer goods and capital investment. 
But as contacts abroad attenuate and diasporas tend to increasingly invest in their new 
country, the diaspora slice is shrinking. 
 
Fourth, the ‘tricks of life’. These are everyday negotiations, characterised as ‘tricks 
of everyday life’ by Béatrice Pouligny, have a fundamental impact on local adaptation 
that promote survival, social relations and social inclusion.38 This kind of activity, not 
to be equated with morally heinous trafficking, continues a tradition, often with inter-
ethnic transactions that are not mediated by the externals, and in which volatile 
ethnicity issues are marginalised. The tricks of life do not conform to the rationalism 
of the current economic engineering, nor to what the externals write off as a red-tape 
socialist past, but to a traditional quest for sufficiency and subsistence, quite 
independent of the constructed view of a transition to a particular future.39 They 
enable people to participate in ‘free markets’ par excellence, in the sense that they are 
not regulated by authority but offer ‘daily reinvented social norms around the claim to 
subsistence’.40  
 
In sum, there is a case for arguing that people cope not only because of the 
benefits of an international administration and presence but also in spite of it. The 
dismissal of ‘tricks of life’ as socially corrosive and leading to moral collapse,41 is to 
misunderstand the social cement that it provides in conditions where social corrosion 
is fostered by increasing disparities of wealth under shared sovereignty. Further more, 
although ‘corruption’ undoubtedly accounts for a high proportion of gdp in the region, 
in absolute terms it pales into insignificance with corruption in Iraq and the main sites 
of capitalism and their offshore tax havens.42  
 
This asymmetry of morality and power in shared sovereignty is further 
illustrated by the issue of immunity. 
 
 
                                                 
38 Béatrice Pouligny, Peacekeeping Seen From Below, London: Hurst, 2006. 
39 Larisa Jašarević ‘Everyday Work: Subsistence Economy, Social Belonging and Moralities of 
Exchange at a Bosnian (Black) Market’, in Xavier Bougarel, Elissa Helms and Ger Duijzings, The New 
Bosnian Mosaic: Identities, memories and Moral Claims in a Post-War Society, Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2006, pp.274 (n.2), 284.  
40 Ibid., p.292. 
41 Andreas, p.344. 
42 See, Raymond W. Baker, Capitalism’s Achilles Heel: Dirty Money and How to Renew the Capitalist 
System New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2005; ‘Corruption: the ‘second insurgency’ costing $4bn a 
year’, The Guardian (London), 2 Dec. 2006, pp.16–17; George Monbiot, ‘The parallel universe of 
BAE: covert dangerous and beyond the rule of law The Guardian, 13 Feb. 2007, p.29; Duncan 
Campbell, ‘Britain is “as corrupt as worst African states”’, The Guardian, 4 Sept. 2006, citing John 
Christensen, Director of the Tax Justice Network. 
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7. International Immunities 
 
Political economy is also an arena in which the accountability of the externals can be 
considered an issue. It might be presumed that an international body that sustains a 
legal regime should be held accountable in respect of the violations of that regime by 
its personnel effectively controlling areas and populations.43 In practice the protection 
of privileges and immunities of missions and their personnel is secured through denial 
of jurisdiction, the discretionary interpretations of mandates and the idea that 
international organizations are not like states directly administering a society but 
reside at some Olympian distance from the heat in the kitchen.44 The preservation of 
immunities at international and domestic level cannot be divorced from the political 
origins of the dispensations that grant a kind of trustee status. Although the Council of 
Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights has argued that in UN administrations 
legal and political responsibility lies with the Secretary-General’s Special 
Representative as head of the administration, the absence of any appellate 
mechanisms to challenge his or her decisions is a serious issue.45 UNMIK has 
exercised exclusive control and regulation over economic policy and personnel, and 
over public and socially-owned property and enterprises. Moreover, the constitutional 
framework for Kosovo specified that the Special Representative would decide the 
parameters of budgetary and monetary policy. 
 
Providing remedies for citizens and domestic authorities claiming injury is thus 
problematic when defendants are directly employed by an international agency, which 
claims immunity. This was the case when the privatisation strategy in Kosovo ran into 
difficulties and was suspended in 2003 because international officials were unsure of 
being covered by immunity.46 In BiH the international head of the Indirect Tax 
Authority in BiH reportedly claimed immunity when the RS Prime Minister filed a 
lawsuit in a domestic court concerning flawed process and economic damage in the 
distribution of VAT proceeds.47 As Matteo Tondini points out, the possibility of 
                                                 
43 Carsten Stahn, ‘Accountability and Legitimacy in Practice – Lawmaking by Transitional 
Administrations’; Stahn, “Justice Under Transitional Administration: Contours and Critique of a 
Paradigm” (2005) 27, Houston Journal Int’l Law 311. A lawsuit was registered against the Dutch 
Government in February 2007 in relation to the Srebrenica massacre.  
44 Ralph Wilde, ‘Accountability and International Actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and East 
Timor, vol.7, no.2, International Law Students Association Journal of International and Comparative 
Law, 2001, p.458; Matteo Tondini, ‘The “Italian Job”: How to Make International Organizations 
Compliant with Human Rights and Accountable for their Violations by Targeting Member States’, 
paper for international conference on Accountability for Human Rights Violations by International 
Organisations, Brussels, 16–17 March 2007. 
45 Tondini cites: CoE 16 October 2002, Kosovo : The Human Rights Situation and the Fate of Persons 
Displaced From Their Homes, CommDH(2002)11, www.coe.int/Defaulten.asp, sec. V 1(2). 
46 Bernhard Knoll, ‘From Benchmarking To Final Status? Kosovo And The Problem Of An 
International Administration's Open-Ended Mandate’, 16 Eur.J.Inm’l L. at pp.654–5; Matteo Tondini, 
‘The privatization system in Kosovo: Rising towards an uncertain future’, Pristina, December 2003 
(www.osservatoriobalcani.org/filemanager/download/37/Privatization%20SystemPDF.pdf). 
47 Although his term of office was extended by three months by decision of the High Representative, 
this was also condemned as contravening the authority of the Bosnian Council of Ministers in 
appointing members of the Governing Board. Interview, 9 September 2006, with former senior OHR 
official; N. Diklić, ‘Board Chair Dixon; Dodik: RS lost KM 40 million due to some “ITA omissions” ... 
We are going to sue Joly Dixon’, Nezavisne Novine, (Banja Luka), 6 March 2006, p.5; ‘B-H 
Prosecutor's Office investigating Joly Dixon pursuant to RS lawsuit’, Nezavisne Novine, 2 June 2006.  
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locating concurrent responsibility (and thus judicial liability before either human 
rights regional bodies or domestic courts) with state participants in international 
policing and administration is perhaps the most promising avenue, which could open 
the way to a more comprehensive political and legal response to the issue.48  
 
8. Recommendations 
 
Statebuilding  
 
Whether BiH can become a traditional unitary state is rather doubtful, and the answer 
to domestic sovereignty may be to recognise local autonomies while diminishing 
ethnicity as a fulcrum of political disbursement. The first quarter of 2006 saw 
protracted negotiations over constitutional changes, leading to an agreement between 
the SDA, SNSD, SDS, HDZ and SDP. The proposals affected the powers and 
responsibilities of the state’s components and had the strong support of the EU and 
United States. The BiH presidency, for example, was to be reformed into a single 
president and two vice presidents. The House of Peoples was restricted to issues of 
vital ethnic interest, and core state responsibilities were expanded. But entity voting 
was retained for the BiH Parliamentary Assembly and the entity-based structure of the 
state was not changed. Nor did the reforms reduce the Cantonal governments in the 
Federation, a layer of authority often bemoaned by the external actors for adding to 
corruption, the costs of government and bureaucratic obstruction. The agreement 
failed to progress.49 In spite of this, negotiations with the European Commission for a 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) continued but were stalled by failure 
to secure full cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, a public broadcasting law in the 
Federation that would have ended ethnic channels and police restructuring to abolish 
the RS police autonomy. The European Commission’s conditions for progress were 
clearly not being met. 
 
As critics have made clear, however, the attempt to contrive politics without 
grass-roots support has been highly problematic. The external engineering of elections 
to achieve a power-sharing, consociational model has not worked.50 An outright 
majority nationalist government came to power in the RS under Dodik in October 
2006. But for all its numerous flaws and reification of ethnic divisions, the Dayton 
agreement did accommodate the political impulses in BiH for decentralisation. If 
statebuilding in BiH is to involve abolition of the entities, thereby denying the pre-war 
                                                 
48 Matteo Tondini, ‘The “Italian Job”: How to Make International Organizations Compliant with 
Human Rights and Accountable for their Violations by Targeting Member States’, paper for 
international conference on Accountability for Human Rights Violations by International 
Organisations, LeidenJ. Int’l Law (forthcoming, 2007).  See also, Henry H. Perritt, jr. ‘Providing 
Judicial Review for Decisions by Political Trustees’, 15 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L., winter 2004. pp.1–
58. 
49 Bosniak parties, notably Haris Silajdžić’s Party for BiH, campaigned for a unitary system. The HDZ 
split with a breakaway opposition group – the ‘HDZ 1990’. Small radical parties in the RS objected to 
the move for more centralisation. In April 2006, the agreement failed to get a two-thirds majority in the 
Assembly. 
50 Roberto Belloni, ‘Peacebuilding and consociational electoral engineering in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.11, No.2, pp.334–53; David Chandler (ed.), Peace 
without Politics? Ten Years of State-Building in Bosnia, London: Routledge, 2005. 
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unrest brought about by perceived and actual over-centralisation of resources and 
authority at both Yugoslav and Republic levels, then violent resentment rather than 
reconciliation may recur. Paradoxically the RS bureaucracy is more straightforward 
for external actors to deal with than either the Federation with its cantonal 
government system or the BiH state.  
 
The contours of regional autonomy need to be recognised. A centralised 
unitary state will be contested. A decentralised unitary state may not be enough to 
satisfy the quests for autonomy by the RS. A confederation (an idea subject to the 
vitriolic attacks of US founders, Madison and Hamilton) is nowadays more 
fashionable (and favored by the SDS) but is probably too ambitious for the BiH 
context, which lacks the forcing house of external threats. A centralised, unitary state 
will not undo ethnic cleansing or stall pressures for a decentralised political 
arrangement. On the other hand, the constitution could be altered to eliminate 
ethnic/religious discrimination. This may yet be the outcome of an application to the 
European Court of Human Rights launched by Jakob Finci, a Jewish leader, to lift the 
prohibition on Jews and other minorities running for the Bosnian presidency. And 
there are signs that prohibitions are weakening. The Minister for Education in RS is a 
Croat, and an SDP candidate, Željko Komsić, who during the war fought with the 
Bosniak Army against fellow Croats, won the Croat seat in the presidency in October 
2006, thereby threatening the monopoly of the ethnically-pure Croat parties. 
 
Borderlands 
 
Economic enterprises that link borderlands across frontiers and bind poor areas to 
wealthier ones could be supported. In the BiH case, the role of farm co-operatives that 
feed processing industries, in milk products and fruit, for example, have been 
relatively successful in linking deprived areas to growth centres.  
 
Macroeconomic Stability 
 
The impacts of macroeconomic stability should be revisited. The IFIs have generally 
lacked flexibility and  long-term vision in their approaches to production and 
equitable growth and have lacked flexibility. For example, as a quid pro quo for 
engaging foreign investors, states should be allowed credit or a system of 
concessionary bond issues. In this way the Bechtel organisation got the Croatian 
government to deficit finance the building of a highway. 
 
Production 
 
The emphasis on a service and trading economy has provided more space for 
organised crime and corruption. A new emphasis should be on supporting production, 
temporary protection, new infrastructure and import substitution. The absence of 
institutional support for industry and agriculture has been remarkable. The new 
government in Macedonia of October 2006 may provide a model in this respect. It is 
establishing a state marketing agency for production and processing and has 
introduced a lower VAT rate of 5% on agricultural equipment and materials. Co-
operatives in BiH should be registered in order to provide support and tax relief on 
implements and materials – as well as to improve gdp measurement.  Diaspora 
remittances are a major source of finance for post-conflict reconstruction but are 
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overwhelmingly directed into short-term private consumption rather than long-term 
investment. Policymakers should consider how to make remitting easier and cheaper 
and offer incentives and concessions for diaspora investment in productive capacity.  
 
The absence of trade restrictions has created opportunities for growth in some 
areas (the export of hydroelectric power for example). But competition in the global 
market is tough and, unlike in Africa for example, large investments are required to 
make enterprises pay. They tap a small market, and several go bankrupt or struggle to 
keep afloat (e.g. Široki Brijeg paper factory). Paradoxically, the BiH Trade Protection 
Treaty ended in 2004–05, having operated at a time when BiH had very little to 
protect.  
 
Privatisation and FDI 
 
The process of privatisation has already been documented and analysed in the 
literature, but the impact of the process on production, employment, shadow 
economies and economic change needs investigation. The picture has been mixed. 
The banking sector is considered the greatest success in privatisation, whereas 
production and service enterprises sometimes became milch cows, notably Telecom, 
Energoinvest and Elektropriveda. Privatisation and FDI have not been panaceas. The 
processes of privatisation have been corrupt and FDI is a fickle mistress that can 
diminish and extract wealth as much as improve and generate it. FDI is needed to 
bring in new ideas and to improve transparency. But it should be regulated to ensure 
investment is not carpet-bagging but accompanied by social investment. 
 
Revenue Generation 
 
Special attention should be paid to revenue because of its key role in state building 
and economic reforms. The creation of a revenue enhancing National Border Service 
was a significant step in BiH that has cut smuggling and duty evasion. But high 
employment taxes have had a depressing impact on growth and should be pitched 
lower. A single rate of VAT has been problematic for the vulnerable because social 
programs meant to compensate for hardship have not been implemented as a 
consequence of low institutional capacity. What is good enough for the rest of the EU 
in the form of variable rates good enough for the BiH. A single rate may have been 
easier to administer but the EU has managed the process with minimum finesse and 
maximum political aggravation, ratcheting up inter-entity hostility, second only in 
political impact to the ICJ case. Another issue in the audit regime is that there is no 
law requiring people to reveal the origin of their property. 
 
Shadow Economies 
 
 There have been major strides in customs, policing and the EU’s Customs and Fiscal 
Assistance Office is now much reduced in activity since 2001. The Single Registry of 
Transaction Accounts and the introduction of VAT has had a significant impact on 
reducing fraud and money laundering.51 But policing and administrative measures 
alone do not provide adequate incentive structures for formal activity because shadow 
                                                 
51 Interview with Dinka Antić, Indirect Tax Authority, Banja Luka, 8 Sept. 2006. 
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operations are easily displaced into other shadow activities. Reduction of shadow 
economies will depend on a more buoyant, formal employment situation. 
 
Employment 
 
Retraining and labour flexibility is a major problem for employers. Mittal replaced 
general contracts with individual contracts at the Zenica plant and will shed elderly 
workers. But without adequate social protection, the burden of transition falls heavily 
on those affected. Reduction of rigidities in the labour market (numbers, skills, 
capacity) should be accompanied by social protection in line with the ILO’s Decent 
Work Agenda, EU employment policy and the Laeken criteria.52 But this requires 
strong institutions and local authorities, including employment services, to manage 
social protection. The aim is to provide incentives through social protection to 
increase productivity, mobility and willingness to adjust. It can also make allies of 
workers who are in a position to ‘blow the whistle’ on corruption. Treating the 
unemployed as irrelevant and surplus to requirements undermines social stability. The 
role of external actors could be more focused on job creation, poverty reduction, and 
support for the self-employed. A variety of labor-based programs generated by the 
ILO over the past 20 years have refined the concept of public works for 
reconstruction, sometimes with World Bank support. They can generate two to four 
times the number of jobs compared to equipment-intensive programs and, with a 
finessed approach, are not simply ‘make-work’ schemes but contribute to transition.53
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The focus of this paper has been on BiH. But there are parallels elsewhere in the 
region that reflect the legacies of earlier systems as well as the impact of conflict. The 
frontiers of Kosovo are disputed: both their status and location. On the 
Macedonia/Kosovo frontier (unpatrolled by UNMIK and the Macedonian forces), 
there is a clear instance of a classic borderland used for smuggling migrants and 
goods though mountainous terrain. The lack of infrastructure in this border area 
makes its potential for growth currently limited, but there are large, virtually 
abandoned, former enterprises in the valleys (e.g. cement works) that could generate 
economic development. Macedonia and Kosovo also have a duplication of institutions 
to answer the needs of ethnic groups. In Macedonia, Albanians have contrived to 
create their own chamber of commerce; in Kosovo, social protection in northern 
Mitrovica is subsidised by the government in Belgrade. In addition, both territories 
reveal flaws in transition processes. These include:  
● the tensions arising from nationalist claims in statebuilding,  
● geographical and social sector disparities in wealth and economic dynamics, 
● the collapse of industrial production and mining,  
● the significant role of shadow economies and high levels of corruption 
● the importance of diaspora remittances to improve coping rather than for capital 
investment 
                                                 
52 Sandrine Cazes and Alena Nesporova, Labour Markets in Transition: Balancing Flexibility and 
Security in Central and Eastern Europe, Geneva: ILO, 2003. 
53 See particularly, Mike Shone, ‘Labour-based Infrastructure Rebuilding’, in Eugenia Date-Bah (ed.),  
Jobs After War: A critical challenge in the peace and reconstruction puzzle, Geneva: ILO, 2003. 
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● the paucity of FDI 
● inability to compete internationally and lack of import substitution 
● the neglect by internationals and local elites of high unemployment.  
 
The common orthodoxy is that EU expansion to the region would reintroduce missing 
incentives to reform and provide a stabilising framework for crisis management, as it 
did in Macedonia. This strategy – repairing state weakness and preparing for 
integration – is a widely-supported solution even by populations and by critics of 
external intervention.54  In BiH membership of the EU is supported by large 
majorities, ranging from 88% in Bosniak areas to 62% in Serb-dominated areas.55 Yet 
much analysis of Southeast Europe fails to address the region’s vulnerability to 
economic integration with the EU, ignores the strains that liberal economic policies 
have introduced, and does not question whether reliance on export-led growth is an 
optimal economic strategy for economically weak states emerging from a war 
environment.  
 
The International Commission on the Balkans noted the lack of sustainability of 
the small markets, and recommended that the history of economic interdependence in 
the region could be mobilised to create a common economic space.56 It conforms to 
historical patterns of development, whereby selective protection and import 
substitution generates economic activity and growth – which then facilitates 
integration and the reduction of protection. Other economies, including the EU states 
and the United States (50 per cent of whose federal revenue derived from tariffs in 
1900), have been through this process. Southeast Europe is expected to achieve it in 
ten years rather than 50.57 Analysts generally do not discuss the region’s vulnerability 
to economic integration with the EU, ignore the strains that liberal economic policies 
have introduced, and do not question whether reliance on SMEs and export-led 
growth is an optimal economic strategy for an economically underdeveloped and 
weak states emerging from war.  
 
What does this mean for the future of shared sovereignty? As the philosopher 
Terry Eagleton writes: ‘Unless authority entwines itself with the roots of people’s 
experience and identity it will remain too abstract and aloof to win their loyalty’.58 
Moreover, empowerment in countries that resist integration lies in what John Burton 
called meeting ‘basic needs’. In his critique of US global social policy Francis 
Fukuyama recognises: 
 
[t]he reason that Washington has so little to offer in the social sphere is 
that American politics itself has focused on cutting back on the state sector 
                                                 
54 B. Steil and Susan L. Woodward, ‘A European New Deal for the Balkans?’, Foreign Affairs Vol.78, 
No.6, November-December 1999, pp.95–105. 
55 UNDP, p.91. 
56 International Commission on the Balkans, The Balkans in Europe’s Future, April 2005 (available at: 
www.balkan-commission.org/activities/Report.pdf), pp.31–2 
57 Susan L. Woodward, ’Economic Priorities for Successful Peace Implementation’, in Stephen 
Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth Cousens (eds.), Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of 
Peace Agreements, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002, pp.183–214. 
58 Terry Eagleton, ‘Those in power are right to see multiculturalism as a threat’, The Guardian, 21 Feb. 
2007, p.32. 
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and social services in the past generation….[but] if true supporters of 
liberal democracy and free markets are ever to compete successfully with 
the Islamists and populists of the world, they need to have a social agenda 
that gives some hope not just to the middle-class and educated, but to those 
isolated and excluded as well.59  
 
In the UNDP’s surveys of BiH, the economic stability index is always the 
weakest element in the raft of indexes, and the economic record of the OHR is rated 
as negative by 54.1% of respondents. More than any other causes, the loss of work, 
inability to find work, pensions and repossession of property would bring people out 
to protest or strike, however futile such gestures might seem. Yet work and income 
generation, which would increase consumption power, does not seem to have been a 
particularly high priority for local elites and external actors. Certainly, it is essential to 
deal with the issue of shadow economies through policing, regulation and the creation 
of a beneficial business environment. However, these efforts have not so far sufficed 
to wean people off non-observable economies, including ‘crime’ and informal 
employment. Other, creative approaches now also need to be considered. 
 
                                                 
59 Francis Fukuyama, ‘Commentary: Keeping Up With the Chavezes’, The Wall Street Journal, 1 Feb. 
2007. 
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Appendix: BiH Economic Indicators, 1998–2006 
Notes: n/a  not available; NOE non-observable economy; CPI  consumer price index; FDI  foreign direct 
investment. * estimated. † The unemployment rate is based on the size of the active labor force. For 
definitions and ILO criteria, see  Labour Force Survey, April 2006. 
Sources: European Commission, European Economy: The Western Balkans in Transition, Occasional Paper 
no.1, DGA Economic and Financial Affairs, Brussels, January 2003; Central Bank of BiH; BiH Statistics 
Agency; IMF and World Bank reports; Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW) and 
Balkan Observatory; Living Standards Measurement Survey, 2001 and panel surveys in 2002-04; Living in 
BiH  surveys, 2001-04; BiH Economic Policy Planning Unit working paper, No.1, 2006; BiH Medium- term 
Development Strategy Paper, 2006; Preliminary Report of Poverty in BiH for 2001-2004, May 2005; Labour 
Force Survey, 2006; quarterly UNDP Early Warning surveys. 
 
Indicator 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Nominal GDP: 
million KM 
 
7,650
 
8,990   
 
10,050  
 
10,480  
 
11,651  
 
12,303  
 
13,440  
 
14,361* 
 
Real GDP: % 
change  
(ex. NOE, inc. 
inflation)  
 
 
n/a 
 
 
9.9 
 
 
5.5 
 
 
3.8 
 
 
9.9 
 
 
4.5 
 
 
8.5 
 
 
4.0* 
 
GDP per cap.  
current prices  
 
2,413   
 
2,685   
 
2,886  
 
2,758 
 
3,066 
 
3,238    
 
3,537 
  
GDP per cap 
inc.NOE  
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
4,424    
 
4,668 
 
n/a 
  
Registered 
Unemp (%)  
 
37.4     
 
38.9     
 
39.7    
 
40.0 
 
n/a 
 
41.3 
 
41.9 
 
43.3 
 
47.0 
Unemp rate 
ILO criteria (1)  
n/a n/a n/a 16.1 20.9 n/a 23.8 n/a 31.1 
Self-evaluated % 
Unemployed  
Employed 
Inactive 
 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
 
16.1  
44.3  
39.6     
 
20.9  
45.4.0  
38.7    
 
n/a   
n/a  
n/a   
 
23.8 
45.4 
30.8 
  
Poverty ( % 
below poverty 
line) 
FBiH 
RS 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
n/a 
 
19.1 
 
n/a 
n/a 
 
19.5 
 
16.3 
24.8 
 
n/a 
 
15.4 
 
 
 
17.8 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Income share of 
Richest 1/5th(7) 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
35.8 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
37.1 
  
Agric prodn % 
change 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
–6.8 
 
+4.8 
 
+2.6 
 
–6.5 
   
Industrial prodn 
% real change 
 
+8.0 
 
+7.9 
 
+4.9 
 
+5.7 
 
+5.1 
 
+12.1 
 
+11.0 
  
CPI: % p.a. n/a 5.6 4.9 3.1 1.3 1.1     0.7 2.9*  
Government 
Budget   
(% GDP)       
 
–7.8 
 
–7.0 
 
–3.3 
 
–0.2 
 
+0.8 
 
+1.0 
   
Current a/c bal. ( 
% of GDP)             
 
–10.2
 
–8.7 
 
–16.9 
 
–22.1 
 
–24.5 
 
–22.3 
        * 
–21.8 
  
FDI inflows € 
millions         
165.9 158.6 132.8 281.8 337.6 400.4 240.0   
